



The Location of Cultural Authenticity: Identifying the Real and the 
Fake in Urban Guizhou
Kendall, P.
 
This is an author's accepted manuscript of an article to be published in the The China 
Journal, vol. 77, 2017. The final definitive version will be available online.
The WestminsterResearch online digital archive at the University of Westminster aims to make the 
research output of the University available to a wider audience. Copyright and Moral Rights remain 
with the authors and/or copyright owners.
Whilst further distribution of specific materials from within this archive is forbidden, you may freely 
distribute the URL of WestminsterResearch: ((http://westminsterresearch.wmin.ac.uk/).
In case of abuse or copyright appearing without permission e-mail repository@westminster.ac.uk
1The Location of Cultural Authenticity:
Identifying the Real and the Fake in Urban Guizhou
Paul Kendall
Abstract
This paper examines notions of cultural identity and authenticity, and how these 
notions are articulated in the small city of Kaili in Guizhou Province, an ethnically diverse 
region. Despite its urban status, Kaili has been branded by the local government as a 
yuanshengtai tourist destination. This Chinese term literally translates as “original 
ecology”, but is used in ordinary conversation to denote a cultural authenticity in which 
people exist in quiet harmony with nature. Advertising uses the term to tout the ethnic 
cultural practices that mainly occur in the villages of Kaili’s municipal periphery. In 
contrast, many local urban inhabitants – although amenable to the promotion of Kaili as a 
tourist destination – have rejected the notion that the city itself could be considered 
culturally authentic, and proudly declare themselves “fake” ethnic minorities, as against 
the “genuine” ethnic people of surrounding villages. These small-city inhabitants have also 
defined themselves against big-city visitors by attributing to the visitors a naïve fascination 
with cultural authenticity, while themselves remaining aloof from such practices. The 
cultural authenticity discourse in Kaili has thus facilitated a re-ordering of social and 
spatial hierarchies, as blasé small-city residents define themselves against both culturally 
authentic rural people and authenticity-seeking big-city tourists. In analyzing this, the paper 
draws out the broader implications regarding PRC notions of ethnicity, cultural practices, heritage, 
and identity.
One evening in 2011, in Kaili, a small city in Guizhou, I attended a provincial government-
organized choral singing competition. A number of groups from Kaili and the surrounding counties 
of Qiandongnan Miao and Dong Autonomous Prefecture – of which Kaili is the capital – were 
competing for the right to progress to the provincial finals in Guiyang.1 It was mandatory for each 
administrative area of the prefecture to send a “representative group” (daibiao dui) to participate in 
1
 This singing competition was a part of Colourful Guizhou (Duocai Guizhou), a long-running series of 
cultural events aimed at raising the profile of the province. For a short report on the Qiandongnan final, see 
Ouyang Bin, “2011 Duocai Guizhou gechang dasai Qiandongnan saiqu zongjuesai quanmian kaimu 
(Qiandongnan regional final of 2011 ‘Colourful Guizhou’ singing competition begins),” in Qiandongnan 
Ribao (Qiandongnan Daily), June 15, 2011, 2. 
2the competition. However, Tianzhu county had been either unable or unwilling to comply, and had 
subsequently paid a sum of money to a local Kaili choir - of which an acquaintance of mine, Xue 
Baojian,2 was a member - to covertly perform on their behalf. This unofficial proxy group 
performed the song The Miao Family Welcomes Happiness, adhering largely to Western choral 
music in terms of singing style, instrumental accompaniment and group structure, but with the 
addition of lyrical, melodic, and sartorial elements associated with the Miao minority. 
Unfortunately, the preceding group, from Jinping county, had performed exactly the same song. 
Consequently, the efforts of Tianzhu’s unlikely representative group were received with 
amusement by the audience, and low marks by the judges.
After his performance, Xue Baojian spotted and joined me in the audience for the rest of the 
competition, during which time he passed frequent comment on the remaining acts. While around 
half of the groups adopted a performance style similar to his own group, there were also some acts 
which Baojian approvingly identified as “culturally authentic” (yuanshengtai    ). This 
assessment was in marked contrast to his amused references regarding the inauthenticity of his own 
group’s performance. Beyond the fact that his Kaili-based group was clandestinely representing 
another county for money, he also pointed out that the “silver” ornamentation of their costumes 
consisted mainly of foil. At the same time, he was convinced of the authenticity of other 
performances in the same competition. He applied the label of yuanshengtai to a performance from 
Liping county, which the hosts presented as a “labor song” (laodong ge) of the Dong minority, and 
which began with performers imitating the sounds of farmyard animals. Baojian enthusiastically 
commented that the performers were “genuine peasants” (zhenzheng de nongmin), wider audience 
reaction was audibly positive, the television hostess declared that “the lives of working people are 
really happy”, and the judges awarded their highest marks so far. A second Dong act, from 
Rongjiang county, trooped on stage and was declared yuanshengtai by Baojian even before singing 
had commenced. Just after his remark, the singers were joined on stage by a pianist and a 
conductor, prompting a swift reappraisal from Baojian; the Dong do not have this kind of thing in 
their music, he commented, and added, this group will definitely get a lower mark than Liping. 
I encountered many similar references to yuanshengtai during nine months of fieldwork in 
Kaili city during 2011 and 2012.3 Since the mid-2000s, the term has operated in advertising to 
promote Kaili as a tourist destination for the experience of authentic minzu (or ethnic) culture 
rooted in a rural place. Monikers attached to Kaili, such as the “homeland of 100 festivals” and an 
2
 Pseudonyms are used throughout this article.
3
 Fieldwork consisted of participant observations combined with 32 unstructured interviews and the reading 
of local newspapers, gazetteers, almanacs, tourism literature, and Party journals. I wish to express my 
gratitude to the University of Westminster, whose provision of a PhD scholarship made this fieldwork 
possible.
3“ocean of song and dance”,4 have advertised the festivals of ethnic-minority groups who have long 
been associated with the most rural and remote parts of China. While this branding has conveyed a 
certain rural flavor, at the same time the local government has striven to transform Kaili into a 
bigger city. This focus on urbanism began during the mid-1990s and gathered pace during the early 
2000s, with the instigation of a ‘civilizing project’ geared towards the facilitation of traffic, the 
development of urban infrastructure, the sanitization of streets, and official efforts to get the 
populace to act in a civil, orderly manner. This process has been aligned with the desire to create a 
clean and well-ordered tourist destination, but it has also created a dense urban environment at 
odds with the branding’s emphasis on rural minzu practices.
While I have described elsewhere the branding strategy of Kaili as the homeland of 100 
festivals despite its urban environment,5 in this article I ask how the inhabitants of Kaili experience 
and reinterpret their city in light of the obvious disparities between the city’s branding and 
everyday urban life. Although amenable to the promotion of their city as a tourist destination, local 
inhabitants generally rejected the notion that Kaili could be considered culturally authentic,6 and 
instead reserved this term to describe surrounding villages. Some urbanites even conceived of Kaili 
as a city of “fake” ethnic minorities, in contrast to the “real” ethnic peasants of remote villages. In 
doing so, they undermined the minzu classification system of the PRC while simultaneously 
reinforcing the urban-centered othering of “genuine peasants”. Their discourse involved more than 
a mere reiteration of the rural-urban divide; it enabled a reordering of urban hierarchies, as small-
city inhabitants patronized big-city visitors for their assumed fascination with exotic cultural 
practices. Yuanshengtai discourse thus both reinforced and complicated rural-urban hierarchies, as 
small-city residents defined themselves against both authenticated rural minorities and authenticity-
seeking big-city tourists.
Yuanshengtai as Authenticity
The literal translation of yuanshengtai as “original ecology” is clumsy but it highlights the fact that 
yuanshengtai suggests a strain of authenticity which stresses both the untainted original and 
4
 For example, see “Kaili: zuoshou lüyou youshou yiju (Kaili: tourism on the one hand, liveability on the 
other),” Dangdai Guizhou (Guizhou Today), no. 9 (2010): 60.
5
 Paul Kendall, “Between Big City and Authentic Village: Branding the Small Chinese City,” City 19, no. 5 
(2015): 665–80.
6
 To be precise, inhabitants invariably rejected the branding of Kaili as yuanshengtai during informal 
conversation, but when asked to describe the city during recorded interviews, it was relatively common for 
the same individuals to fall back on the stereotypical description of Kaili as yuanshengtai.
4humankind’s relationship with the natural environment.7 It is a relatively new term for the 
description of cultural products, music and dance performances, having become a buzzword of the 
PRC media during the mid-2000s. It has also been employed by both Chinese and foreign scholars 
as a means to categorize, celebrate, and advocate the preservation of various cultural practices.8  
While the majority of English-language works have focused on the usage of yuanshengtai in these 
media and academic contexts,9 this article follows this discourse into the everyday conversations of 
a small city.10 
Outside of Chinese studies, there has been a good deal of literature in tourism studies relating 
to authenticity.11 In particular, Dean MacCannell, the trailblazer of tourism studies, has provided an 
interpretation of how authenticity was constructed under the specific conditions of Western 
modernity.12 He argues that the Western tourist’s quest for authenticity is motivated by the sense of 
inauthenticity produced by the fragmented and alienating experience of the modern everyday. 
Tourists search for authenticity in sites that they consider both remote and pre-modern. However, 
7
 The exact meaning of yuanshengtai has been contested. Scholars have generally agreed that it is an 
amalgamation of two words, the second of which, “shengtai”, means “ecology”. However, there has been 
less consensus over the first word, “yuan”, which could be understood as “original”, “primitive” or even 
“place”. Fieldwork acquaintances commonly interpreted “yuan” as shorthand for “yuanshi”, which can be 
translated as “original”, “primeval”, or “primitive”, according to context. See Zhu Bingxiang, “Hewei 
‘Yuanshengtai’? Weihe ‘Yuanshengtai?’ (What Is Original Ecology and Why Original Ecology?),” 
Yuanshengtai Minzu Wenhua Xuekan (Journal of Original Ecological National Culture), no. 3 (2010): 1-4.
8
 For critiques of yuanshengtai, see Naran Bilik, “‘Yuanshengtai’ haishi ‘huoshengtai’? (Original ecology or 
living ecology?),” Yuanshengtai Minzu Wenhua Xuekan (Journal of Original Ecological National Culture), 
no. 3 (2010): 14-7; Weng Naiqun, “Bei ‘yuanshengtai’ wenhua de renleixue sikao (Anthropological views on 
the influence of ‘original ecology’ culture),” Yuanshengtai Minzu Wenhua Xuekan (Journal of Original 
Ecological National Culture), no. 3 (2010): 5-13; and Zhu Fengyu, “Zhiyi: Yuanshengtai + Changfa? (Query: 
Yuanshengtai + Singing Technique?),” Renmin Yinyue (People’s Music), no. 3 (2008): 31–33. 
9
 For example, Lauren Gorfinkel, “From Transformation to Preservation: Music and Multi-Ethnic Unity on 
Television in China,” in Music as Intangible Cultural Heritage: Policy, Ideology, and Practice in the 
Preservation of East Asian Traditions, ed. Keith Howard (Farnham: Ashgate, 2012), 99–112; and Helen 
Rees, “Environmental Crisis, Culture Loss, and a New Musical Aesthetic: China’s ‘Original Ecology 
Folksongs’ In Theory and Practice,” Ethnomusicology 60, no. 1 (2016): 53–88.
10
 In this context, “authentic” seems a more appropriate translation of yuanshengtai than “original 
ecology”; the latter provides equivalence at word level, but does not reflect the casual, non-technical 
language of the everyday in which yuanshengtai has become embedded.
11
 For example, Edward M. Bruner, “Abraham Lincoln as Authentic Reproduction: A Critique of 
Postmodernism,” American Anthropologist, New Series, 96, no. 2 (1994): 397–415; Erik Cohen, 
“Authenticity and Commoditization in Tourism,” Annals of Tourism Research 15, no. 3 (1988): 371–86; and 
Kjell Olsen, “Authenticity as a Concept in Tourism Research: The Social Organization of the Experience of 
Authenticity,” Tourist Studies 2, no. 2 (2002): 159–82.
12
 Dean MacCannell, “Staged Authenticity: Arrangements of Social Space in Tourist Settings,” American 
Journal of Sociology 79, no. 3 (1973): 589–603; and Dean MacCannell, The Tourist: A New Theory of the 
Leisure Class (New York: Schocken Books, 1999 [1976]).
5this quest is doomed to failure; there can be no escape from the modern everyday, which pursues 
the tourist wherever he or she may travel.13 
There are similarities between MacCannell’s Western-oriented conceptualization of cultural 
authenticity and yuanshengtai, even though domestic tourism in southwest China has not 
developed in the same manner as mass Western tourism. Tourism as a commercial leisure activity 
was typically regarded as unacceptably bourgeois in Maoist China,14 and continued to be seen by 
some government officials as an immoral distraction from the task of production during the early 
post-Mao era.15 The recent explosion of tourism in southwest China over the last couple of decades 
is an extension of the triumph of Chinese consumerism, and at the same time has been entwined 
with the notion of heritage, which has also experienced a dramatic reversal in fortunes. Although 
heritage was not deliberately targeted for destruction during the 1980s – as it had been during the 
1966 attack on the “Four Olds” – the recent domestic importance attached to heritage is predated 
by backpacker tourism in southwest China, which saw places such as Lijiang and Dali in Yunnan 
province become popular destinations for independent foreign tourists during the late 1980s and 
1990s. China joined UNESCO's International Convention Concerning the Protection of World 
Cultural and Natural Heritage in 1985, but domestic heritage tourism did not really become 
properly established until the mid-1990s.16 Moreover, the intangible aspect of heritage tourism only 
became prominent in the mid-2000s, following China’s ratification of the UNESCO Convention on 
the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage in 2004.17
Heritage is, of course, intertwined with notions of authenticity. The anthropologist Stevan 
Harrell has claimed an inherent tension in China’s participation in the world heritage movement; it 
aspires to international standards as part of its nation-building efforts, yet these standards – with 
their stress on the authentic original – conflict with a Confucian tradition which does not clearly 
distinguish between the authentic and the new.18 According to Harrell, this tension has produced a 
tendency towards reconstruction and restoration in China, rather than preservation. 19 Some 
scholars have also argued that Chinese tourists expect tourist sites to be developed and 
13
 For a similar argument from the same era, see Henri Lefebvre, The Production of Space, trans. Donald 
Nicholson-Smith (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991 [1974]), 352–3. 
14
 Socialism’s own version of tourism consisted of visits to model villages such as Dazhai or Xiaojinzhuang.
15
 Pál Nyíri, “Between Encouragement and Control: Tourism, Modernity and Discipline in China,” in Asia 
on Tour: Exploring the Rise of Asian Tourism, ed. Tim Winter, Peggy Teo, and T. C. Chang (London: 
Routledge, 2009), 153–4.
16
 Xiaobo Su and Peggy Teo, The Politics of Heritage Tourism in China: A View from Lijiang (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2009), 28.
17
 Harriet Evans and Michael Rowlands, “Reconceptualising Heritage in China: Museums, Development and 
Shifting Dynamics of Power,” in Museums, Heritage and International Development, ed. Paul Basu and 
Wayne Modest (London: Routledge, 2015).
18
 Stevan Harrell, “China’s Tangled Web of Heritage,” in Cultural Heritage Politics in China, ed. Tami 
Blumenfield and Helaine Silverman (New York: Springer, 2013), 287–8.
19
 On the ideal of preservation through renewal and reconstruction in East and Southeast Asia, see also Anna 
Karlström, Preserving Impermanence: The Creation of Heritage in Vientiane, Laos (Uppsala: Uppsala 
University, 2009); and Evans and Rowlands, “Reconceptualising Heritage in China”.
6performance-oriented, in contrast to authenticity-seeking Westerners.20 Yet these arguments either 
pre-date or overlook the Chinese discourse of yuanshengtai, which absolutely valorises the 
authentic original, even if the ideals of absolute cultural authenticity can never be realized. Many 
inhabitants of Kaili felt that both domestic and foreign tourists attached great value to authenticity, 
and as I argue below, conceptualized an authenticity of the original, rather than of a reconstructed 
authenticity. It therefore seems appropriate to understand yuanshengtai as belonging to a global 
discourse of cultural authenticity, which bears comparison with MacCannell’s conceptualization of 
authenticity-seeking tourism as an attempt to escape the inauthentic modern everyday. 
Minzu and Rural Place in the “Cultural Authenticity” Discourse
The China Central Television National Young Singer Competition is a well-known televised 
event which is briefly introduced here as an example of how yuanshengtai has operated nationally 
to denote authentic cultural practices rooted in rural ethnic locations.21 From 1986 until 2004, this 
event consisted of three singing categories: tongsu (pop), meisheng (bel canto), and minzu. In this 
context, minzu refers to a “national” style of professionalized folk singing, which often draws on 
minority-ethnic musical elements, but tends to stress technique rather than cultural authenticity. 
Since the early years of the Mao era – and before – musical development in China has been heavily 
influenced by the intertwined goals of modernization and nationalism,22 prompting the 
transformation of local genres, instruments and singing techniques into national forms. Minzu 
singing is one such national form, combining certain elements from Chinese folk opera and 
folksong with the techniques and training methods of Western music. 
Organizers of the Young Singer Competition added a yuanshengtai singing category as a 
fourth category in 2006 in order to satisfy increased audience demand for authenticity, which could 
not be met by the professionalized minzu category.23 Whereas minzu singers were conservatoire-
trained, yuanshengtai singers were to be amateurs who had been raised in an environment 
permeated with orally-transmitted, unamplified music. Whereas minzu singers performed in 
standard Mandarin, yuanshengtai singers were to sing in their original dialect or ethnic-minority 
20
 See Tim Oakes, Tourism and Modernity in China (London: Routledge, 1998), 2; Tim Oakes, “The Village 
as Theme Park: Mimesis and Authenticity in Chinese Tourism,” in Translocal China: Linkages, Identities 
and the Reimagining of Space, ed. Tim Oakes and Louisa Schein (New York, NY: Routledge, 2005), 183–4; 
and Nyíri, “Between Encouragement and Control”, 156.
21
 For more extensive analyses of the Young Singer Competition, see Yang Mang, “The Yuanshengtai 
Movement: Remaking of Chinese Ethnic Minority Identity” (MA thesis, University of Hawai’i, 2009); 
Lauren Gorfinkel, “From Transformation to Preservation”; and Rowan Pease, “Broken Voices”.
22
 Scholars have already comprehensively examined the values which have informed efforts at musical 
modernization by state-funded conservatories, composers and ensembles, as well as their musical results. For 
example, see Richard Curt Kraus, Pianos and Politics in China: Middle-Class Ambitions and the Struggle 
Over Western Music (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); Jonathan Stock, Musical Creativity in 
Twentieth-Century China: Abing, His Music, and Its Changing Meanings, (Rochester: University of 
Rochester Press, 1996); and Andrew Jones, Yellow Music: Media Culture and Colonial Modernity in the 
Chinese Jazz Age (Durham: Duke University Press, 2001).
23
 Rowan Pease, “Broken Voices,” 195.
7language. In contrast to both the minzu and bel canto styles, with their strict, standardized technical 
demands, the yuanshengtai category lacked consistency of technique, with singers potentially 
performing in any folk style from one of China’s 27 provinces and autonomous regions. Instead of 
technique, it was the assumed cultural and ecological origins of yuanshengtai entries which gave 
coherence to this singing category. A yuanshengtai entry – in its ideal form24 – was an authentic 
rendition of everyday amateur practices which had emerged in a location defined by harmonious 
relations between humankind and the natural environment.
This underlying conceptualization of place was present not just in the Young Singer 
Competition but also in the comments of my acquaintances in Kaili city. One of my interviewees – 
a student at Kaili University – stressed the lack of electricity in yuanshengtai locales, which meant 
that “everything is done using what is given by the natural world”. Another interviewee, a young 
worker in the prefectural branch of the commerce bureau, added timelessness to this notion of 
naturalness, explaining that yuanshengtai is “a really natural thing, it is what it is; over a 
millennium, a century, a decade, it has maintained the same appearance, and it hasn’t changed”. A 
third interviewee, a young university teacher, described yuanshengtai as something which has “not 
been affected too much by outside culture”. 
Given this underlying conceptualization of place, it is not surprising that yuanshengtai has 
often been associated with ethnic minorities, particularly of the southwest, since these groups have 
themselves long been associated with the rural, the natural, and the pre-modern. Thus, in the Young 
Singer Competition, ethnic-minority performers predominated in the yuanshengtai category, not 
rural Han.25 Louisa Schein has argued that cosmopolitan Han Chinese began to look to rural ethnic-
inority cultures as “reservoirs of still-extant authenticity” during the cultural identity crisis of the 
1980s, following the destructive years of the Cultural Revolution and the imported foreign cultural 
products of the early reform years.26 In the early twenty-first century, the discourse of yuanshengtai 
has been a continuation of this search for authenticity in rural minzu locales. This search has also 
been accelerated by a shift towards the intertwined political strategies of urbanism and 
consumerism. In the realm of consumption, the ability to differentiate between the authentic 
original and the counterfeit has become a potential matter of life and death as a consequence of 
shanzhai (knock-off) culture. XX This innovative strain of commercialism has involved the sale of 
not only fake clothing brands but also fake (and sometimes toxic) milk powder and even fake eggs. 
Thus, in her study of Dali in Yunnan, anthropologist Beth Notar has argued that authenticity is a 
matter of concern not only for Western travellers but also local inhabitants. Increased 
commodification has contributed to “authenticity anxiety” among Dali townspeople, who in their 
24
 It should be stressed that yuanshengtai did not always appear in this ideal form; Qinghai Television’s entry 
to the 2010 Young Singer Competition included two performers dancing in a two-piece yak costume.
25
 Yang Man, “The Yuanshengtai Movement”, 55.
26
 Louisa Schein, “Gender and Internal Orientalism in China,” Modern China 23, no. 1 (1997): 71–2.
8role as consumers have become increasingly concerned about the circulation of fake products and 
fake money (i.e., counterfeit notes).27 
Rapid urbanization has rendered rural authenticity increasingly precious at the same time as 
the urban has extended into the rural through the development of infrastructure to facilitate city 
tourists’ consumption of publicized authenticity. An increase in leisure time and mobility, as well 
as improved transport, has meant that predominantly rural areas such as southeast Guizhou are 
easily accessible for urban tourists. Yet this is just one aspect of a dual process, as described by 
anthropologist Jenny Chio, whereby the rural is brought closer to modern China through 
infrastructural development but simultaneously characterized as distant in order to serve as an 
attractive destination for domestic tourism.28 Under such conditions, the rural, more than ever, 
becomes the nurturer of traditions which are threatened by urbanization and modernization. 
Although an urban authenticity is possible,29 the city is no place for the fragile, orally-transmitted 
culture of yuanshengtai. The spread of the urban fabric – in terms of both tourism and 
infrastructure – threatens the existence of what could be considered yuanshengtai, but it is this 
same threat which makes yuanshengtai valuable and accessible. This is a contradiction with which 
the branding of Kaili has grappled – in order to promote Kaili as both an accessible, developed 
tourist destination and the homeland of 100 festivals – and it is also one that has shaped discourses 
of authenticity in the everyday life of the city. 
Locating Authenticity
The spatial location – rather than the artistic content – of yuanshengtai has been a matter of 
ambivalence in the branding of Kaili as a tourist destination. Yet in everyday conversations in 
Kaili, the location of a cultural practice was often the decisive factor in determining whether or not 
local inhabitants described it as yuanshengtai. Indeed, fieldwork participants even used the term to 
denote rural places, as well as the cultural practices which these places nurtured. In contrast, they 
declared that the city of Kaili did not possess cultural authenticity on account of its modernization 
and urbanization.
I had first met Xue Baojian at a choir practice in a Kaili park. Both he and the other choir 
singers never accepted that I could have travelled so far to study music in an urban setting, and they 
made repeated efforts to send me to the countryside in order to experience authentic ethnic-
minority music. During one conversation, Auntie Zhang, a retired Qiandongnan Daily clerk, 
insisted that I must go and hear Dong Big Songs at a village in Congjiang county, known as a 
birthplace of this musical genre. Her friend, Auntie Yang, countered that this village was not the 
27
 Beth E. Notar, “Authenticity Anxiety and Counterfeit Confidence: Outsourcing Souvenirs, Changing 
Money, and Narrating Value in Reform-Era China,” Modern China 32, no. 1 (2006): 64–70.
28
 Jenny Chio, “The Appearance of the Rural in China’s Tourism,” Provincial China 3, no. 1 (2011): 60–78.
29
 As a specifically rural form of authenticity, yuanshengtai does not encompass the urban authenticity found 
in other city brands, such as “old Beijing” culture or former colonial architecture.
9only place for Dong Big Songs; I could also hear them in the villages of Liping county, although 
not the county town of Liping itself. I responded that I had already heard Dong Big Songs at Kaili 
University. The two friends were united in their assertion that anything sung at Kaili University 
could not be considered genuine yuanshengtai.
This assertion of inauthenticity was not entirely based upon considerations of location. 
National media, academic articles and everyday conversations in Kaili have additionally 
conceptualized yuanshengtai as self-organized amateur activity which occurs as a natural 
expression of everyday life, whether for the sake of self- entertainment or traditional societal 
functions such as ritual and courting. In contrast, the musical activity promoted as yuanshengtai in 
Kaili usually constituted professionalized entertainment for others. The music department at Kaili 
University ran a “class for the transmitters of minzu culture”, which consisted of training students 
for potential careers in the performance of yuanshengtai music. Funded by the provincial 
government, this five-year vocational degree (zhuanke) offered subsidized classes to high-school 
graduates who ostensibly came from impoverished rural families, but whose numbers also included 
under-achievers from mainstream urban education. First-year students had to study not only the 
representative musical genres of the Dong and Miao minorities, but also more generic skills such as 
bel canto, music theory, and piano; that is, the kind of professional and “scientific” training against 
which yuanshengtai is commonly defined. This kind of training extended into the yuanshengtai 
classes. Rather than learn the six-pipe lusheng, an instrument commonly seen in the festivals of 
Kaili municipality’s rural periphery, students learned to play a modernized lusheng, usually a 19-
pipe version, which facilitated displays of professional virtuosity.
While the formal practices of university departments and song-and-dance troupes may be far 
removed from the amateur ideals of yuanshengtai, there is a great deal of amateur music for self-
entertainment in Kaili city, particularly among the elderly. Indeed, the term “self-entertainment” 
(ziyu zile) was often employed by Kaili inhabitants to describe their own everyday artistic 
practices. In terms of musicianship and social functions, these urban activities were closer to the 
amateur ideals of yuanshengtai than the professionalized performances of local song-and-dance 
troupes. Yet to make this comparison would be to ignore notions of space, minzu, and ultimately, 
hierarchy, which meant that I never encountered an instance where urban amateur activity was 
described as yuanshengtai during my fieldwork in Kaili. Ultimately, rural location was the most 
important determinant of yuanshengtai cultural authenticity, to the extent that amateurism and even 
musical sound were relegated to secondary considerations, as indicated by the following vignette.
During my first fieldwork visit to Kaili, Lan Xunyi, a conservatoire-trained Dong singer, 
insisted on taking me to Xijiang, a well-known Miao settlement in Leishan county. Travelling by 
car, we arrived in the early evening, just in time to catch the second half of a daily scheduled 
performance. I was particularly struck by one song, There Is a Place Called Xijiang (You ge difang 
jiao Xijiang), performed by a male singer in standard Chinese, with a vocal technique closer to bel 
10
canto than Miao folksong. The singer was accompanied by a backing track of lusheng, synthesizers 
and strings. Xunyi seemed surprised when I queried the genre to which the performance belonged, 
saying she thought it was “very yuanshengtai”. A few days later, I observed another performance 
in one of Kaili city’s two main song-and-dance restaurants, whose offerings appeared far closer to 
the musical ideals of yuanshengtai, with genuine acoustic Dong instruments and a less blatantly 
conservatoire-trained singing style. However, Xunyi had previously dismissed music in this and the 
other song-and-dance restaurants of Kaili as too “performance-style” (biaoyanxing) and not 
indigenous to the city. She also told me that people tended not to visit those places any more 
because of the trend towards yuanshengtai, and preferred to go to the villages instead.
While the majority of my Kaili acquaintances agreed that there was no yuanshengtai in the 
city, there were divergences of opinion as to exactly which rural areas of Qiandongnan possessed – 
and constituted – yuanshengtai. Those with stricter criteria than Xunyi declared that there was little 
about Xijiang that could be considered yuanshengtai. A retiree scoffed when I mentioned Xijiang 
during a conversation about yuanshengtai, dismissing it as “man-made” (renmin zao de). All 
human settlements are, of course, man-made, but his reaction implied that there was something 
especially artificial about contemporary Xijiang. During another debate among the park’s choir 
singers, Auntie Yang argued that Xijiang had become “commercialized” (shangyehua); the locals 
did not even grow their vegetables in Xijiang any more, but rather purchased them from stores in 
the city. According to the choir’s chief erhu player, Xijiang had been genuinely minzu during the 
1990s, prior to its development (kaifa).
As indicated by these comments, both development and commercialization were frequently 
presented as destroying the authenticity of not only everyday cultural practices but also a rural 
minority place itself. For those with strict criteria, Xijiang's stage performances were the cultural 
expression of a tourist destination rather than of a rural minority place. In contrast, there was 
almost unanimous praise for the more remote village of Basha in Congjiang county as a place of 
exotic cultural practices. Whereas the urban fabric had already permeated Xijiang through tourism 
and infrastructural development, Basha was still yuanshengtai, at least for the time being. As a 
general rule, the further away a village or region was situated from Kaili, the greater the likelihood 
of consensus among urban inhabitants that it was yuanshengtai. Auntie Yang therefore dismissed 
as inauthentic those annual festivals which took place in villages within the administrative 
boundaries of Kaili municipality, despite featuring six-pipe lusheng and many amateur performers. 
With location as the main authenticator, other properties of yuanshengtai, such as amateurism, 
spontaneity, minzu flavor, and self-organization, derived from its existence in a remote, rural place.
Identifying the Real and the Fake
The importance of location was such that even the presence of ethnic people did not guarantee 
the existence of yuanshengtai. None of my fieldwork acquaintances denied the presence of a 
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substantial non-Han population in Kaili city, and some even over-estimated the percentage of mithe 
ethnic-minority populace in the city in comparison to official statistics.30 However, everyday 
discourse identified two types of ethnic people – real and fake – and only the real minority-ethic 
people were associated with yuanshengtai. In contrast, the fake ethnic populace was the product of 
an urban and modern lifestyle, and no longer spoke the language or practiced the customs of their 
official minzu category. The city produced fake minorities, just as rural place produced real 
minorities and yuanshengtai.
In order to be a real minority, a person had to have been born and raised in a rural place, since 
only continuous dwelling in a rural environment enabled the continued practice of an ethnic 
language and customs. During another conversation in the park, Auntie Zhang had been making 
some sweeping statements about Miao festivals, and I had pointedly asked if she was Miao herself. 
No, I’m Han, she replied. In fact, she continued, I do not think there are any real Miao (zhenzheng 
de Miao) here in our group, only fake Miao (jia Miao). At which point, Auntie Yang, something of 
a contrarian, interrupted to assert that she was in fact a real Dong. So what makes somebody a fake 
Miao, I asked? They cannot speak the ethnic language (yuyan butong), and are not born-and-bred 
in the location in which they reside, answered Auntie Yang.
According to her criteria, only a small percentage of the city’s population could be considered 
real ethnic people, given the many waves of new arrivals to Kaili during the PRC era, as well the 
linguistic dominance of standard Chinese and its Kaili variant. Instead of being the home to “real” 
minorities, inhabitants described Kaili as a new city, even as an “immigrant city” (yimin chengshi), 
where various cultures had intermingled with each other. Such descriptions were apt considering 
the recent history of Kaili, which has seen a constant influx of newcomers, arriving first with the 
administrative headquarters of Qiandongnan in the 1950s, then with the Third Front shift of 
industry to inland regions in the 1960s,31 and finally with the development of tourism in the post-
Mao era.
When urban residents referred to themselves as fake Dong or fake Miao, and as sinicized 
(hanhua), I initially assumed this to be a negative self-description. However, I eventually realized 
that urban ethnic minorities could be proud of their self-proclaimed fake minzu status. This came to 
my attention during an interview with another student at Kaili University.
30
 According to these statistics, the Miao have always been numerically dominant in Kaili municipality, and 
constituted 66.98% of the population in 2013. However, if only the urban districts of Kaili are considered, 
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tongji chubanshe, 2002), 16–17; and Liang Guigang, ed., Guizhou Sheng Nianjian 2013 (Guizhou Yearbook 
2013) (Guiyang: Guizhou nianjian she chuban, 2013), 515.
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 The hugely ambitious and expensive Third Front project came to Kaili in the form of 10 central-run 
industrial enterprises (zhongyang changkuang). These work units and their workers were relocated to Kaili 
from Beijing, Tianjin and other more industrially-developed cities.
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A: Although I’m an ethnic-minority person, I’m fake (laughs).
Me: In what way fake?
A: I’ve already been sinicized (yijing bei hanhua le). My own minority [the Buyi] have their 
own language, but I can’t [speak it]. …Nowadays, it's a diverse society, it's not like, you're in 
a minority area, so I expect you to sing Miao songs, speak Miao, and do everything in this 
way. It can't be like this, society is already open to the outside world.
Me: So “fake Miao” is not necessarily a negative word, then? 
A: No, it’s not negative, it’s not negative. It’s just to say that an individual hasn’t carried 
forward Miao culture, hasn’t carried forward the culture of their minzu, that they already have 
a Han-style and relatively modern lifestyle …it’s not negative (laughs), it’s not negative.
The fake could sometimes be better than the authentic original; there was a discernible pride 
among many urbanities who self-identified as “fake Miao” or “fake Dong”. This celebration of the 
fake appeared to conflict with the seeming adulation of the authentic by Kaili inhabitants that I 
encountered during my time in the city. However, there were good reasons to be a fake minority. 
Most obvious were those cases where a person was born of a mixed minzu (minority and Han) 
relationship. In such cases, parents might choose ethnic-minority status for their child in order that 
he or she could enjoy state privileges, particularly bonus points for the all-important university 
entrance examination (gaokao). For example, one interviewee, a high school student, asserted that 
he was Han, but his Dong mother had changed his minzu status to her own in order for him to gain 
an extra twenty points for the high school entrance examination; “one point is worth 10,000RMB 
[in future earnings]”, he quipped. 
However, the official perks of ethnic status cannot explain why some individuals from pure 
ethnic-minority families also described themselves as fake minzu. As a Miao high-school student 
explained to me, her family was originally from a village in Kaili municipality, but she was a fake 
Miao because she had grown up in the city. Although such comments were most common among 
young urbanites, elderly acquaintances also made similar statements. For example, the 
aforementioned choir’s erhu player was amused when I asked him about his plans for the Miao 
New Year; no, we’re not Miao, we’re already sinicized, he said, before adding that he felt this 
applied to Kaili city as a whole. 
It was therefore the modern city environment, rather than simply lineage, which produced fake 
minorities. Identification with the sinicized and the fake derived from self-association with the 
modern and the urban in a heavily weighted discursive environment, as against the authentic but 
backward ethnic-minority populace of surrounding villages. Beneath its superficially positive 
celebration of authenticity, yuanshengtai carried a negative layer of association with economic 
backwardness, and some of Kaili’s inhabitants were well aware of this association. Some reacted 
against the yuanshengtai label, such as a hip-hop dancer and studio owner:
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My personal viewpoint is one of antipathy towards this word, because wherever you go 
[outside of Kaili], people say “yuanshengtai, yuanshengtai”. Actually, I think this city is really 
diverse. The government is doing its high-intensity city propaganda, and it always does 
yuanshengtai. Actually, yuanshengtai, speaking about it in a nice-sounding way, it's our 
special local minzu characteristics, but speaking in a less nice way, it means “primitive”. So 
when people say "oh, you there [in that place], you're really yuanshengtai", it sounds like a 
positive term, but it’s actually derogatory.
Those who label others yuanshengtai may appear to be paying a compliment, but they are also 
asserting their superiority in the context of China’s socio-spatial hierarchies, where to be sinicized 
and urban is to be modern while to be ethnic-minority and rural is to be backward. Naran Bilik and 
Weng Naiqun have both argued that rural dwellers do not choose the tag of yuanshengtai, but are 
instead “authenticated” (bei yuanshengtai) by urbanites nostalgic for a pre-modern lifestyle.32 
Uniquely, the urban ethnic-minority populace of Kaili straddle this binary: they speak Mandarin, 
but have official minority status; they live in Qiandongnan, an area associated with yuanshengtai, 
but within a city. They could choose to identify with either yuanshengtai culture or urban society. 
Many such young people who were officially designated as being ethnic-minority, in particular, 
embraced the urban, as fake minorities, and rejected yuanshengtai. 
Studies of authenticity and minzu in other parts of China have yielded findings which bear 
some comparison with the fake minorities of Kaili. Anthropologist Beth Notar has argued that 
speakers of the Bai minority language in Dali, Yunnan, associate the false with Han Chinese and 
external things, and the real with the local Bai.33 Anthropologist Joanne Smith Finley has written of 
how in Xinjiang, Uyghurs educated in the Uyghur language (minkaomin) have come to regard 
Uyghurs educated in Chinese (minkaohan) as almost a separate ethnic group, while the minkaohan 
themselves oscillate between feelings of shame at cultural loss and pride in their identification with 
the modern.34 However, fake minorities in Kaili were far less ambiguous in their identification with 
the modern city, to the extent that they openly celebrated their fakeness in opposition to the “real” 
minorities of yuanshengtai. This discourse of real and fake partially reinforced notions of bounded 
minzu categories by heralding the practice of certain cultural forms as evidence of ethnic status. 
Yet at the same time, it facilitated the escape from these categories and their negative associations; 
since the urbanities of Kaili did not themselves engage in yuanshengtai practices or speak minority 
languages, they could claim sinicization, even in opposition to their own official ethnic status or 
32
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familial background. If there are multiple ways of being ethnic in southwest China, then the 
minorities of Kaili indicated that there are also ways of not being ethnic, as they stressed their 
contemporary urban circumstances in order to gain membership to the “unmarked category” of the 
Han majority.35
Repositioning the Small City 
Although urban Kaili produces fake ethnic-minority pepole and rural Qiandongnan produces 
yuanshengtai, the rural-urban divide was not the only geographical imagination relevant to the 
local discourse of authenticity. Instead, the rural-urban divide appeared to exist alongside a more 
complex conceptualization of village, small city and big city, which separated Kaili from big cities 
– domestic or otherwise – and even elevated it above them. An interviewee referred to the 
government and city as “doing yuanshengtai” and a music student at Kaili University described 
Kaili as a “gathering point” (jujidi) for yuanshengtai; despite not possessing real yuanshengtai, the 
city enabled the assembly and concentration of cultural practices from the surrounding counties. 
Kaili was thus positioned as an intermediary between the village and the big city, as a small city 
which packaged and produced yuanshengtai from the supposed raw materials of rural culture for 
consumers from Beijing, Shanghai, and beyond. 
An interview with a third Kaili University student hinted that the yuanshengtai discourse 
involves more than just the two oppositional elements of urban and rural. This student had been 
raised in Kaili, but has many relatives who continued to work as farmers in remote parts of 
Qiandongnan. He did not consider Kaili to be yuanshengtai, but felt that tourists saw things 
differently:
Tourists think Kaili’s air is good, and it’s the most basic kind of lifestyle, without the pursuit 
of things, so they think that it’s a yuanshengtai lifestyle. Not exactly that it’s primitive, but 
that it’s a relatively simple lifestyle…. If you're talking about Beijingers, then Kaili can be 
considered yuanshengtai. But as far as Kaili people are concerned, the life of people out in the 
countryside, in the counties, is yuanshengtai, where they're tilling the land and planting in the 
fields….
For this student, yuanshengtai is a “relative thing”, whose location depends on the residential 
location of the person making the classification. However, there was a further difference between 
Beijingers – as understood by the interviewee – and many of Kaili’s inhabitants, in that the latter 
sang the praises of rural yuanshengtai without themselves being consumers. I initially missed this 
35
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last point, that many fieldwork acquaintances themselves had no personal interest in hearing and 
seeing yuanshengtai. They had frequently recommended that I visit remote villages in order to 
experience yuanshengtai, and I had assumed that an individual would only recommend something 
that he or she also personally enjoyed. A twenty-something Kaili friend once told me that he 
appreciated that foreigners were interested in yuanshengtai but locals like him were already really 
bored with it. I slowly came to realize that this lack of interest was shared by many other 
acquaintances, including those who had enthusiastically recommended that I explore yuanshengtai.
 This became particularly obvious during festive periods, when there were many opportunities 
to observe rural cultural practices, particularly lusheng-dancing and bull-fighting. During the first 
lunar month of 2012, I followed a festival circuit around Kaili’s rural perhiphery, attending events 
in multiple villages, as well as Kaili city proper. I talked with a local tax officer and his friends 
about my festival trip; and he responded, “yeah, it’s interesting when you first go.” “But when we 
go,” added his friend, “it’s just people watching people” (ren kan ren). A 20-something urban Miao 
responded when I asked if she had any plans for the Miao New Year, “Haven’t you noticed yet, we 
locals in Kaili aren’t interested in that stuff, it happened a long time ago here.” Nor were such 
responses restricted to younger people. I talked about festivals with middle-aged and elderly 
members of an indoor choir which I frequently attended. “I’m already used to seeing the festivals, 
and don’t want to see them anymore,” laughed one female singer, who was officially Dong but 
claimed sinicization. 
International and domestic tourists might think of Qiandongnan as a “strange” (xiqi) land, but 
the local customs no longer held any great fascination for many Kaili residents, especially those 
who were officially minorities and had been raised in the area. They had heard and seen it all 
before. Beyond distancing fake minorities from their rural cousins, the blasé attitude of Kaili 
urbanites towards yuanshengtai also reconfigured the hierarchy between small and big city. Kaili 
has admittedly relied quite heavily on the visits and proclamations of cosmopolitan researchers, 
preservationists and cultural commentators for the promotion of local tourism. However, locals 
were to an extent humouring visitors such as myself when they waxed lyrical about yuanshengtai, 
as something which might impress inexperienced outsiders, but in which they had no personal 
interest. While the surrounding remote villages were the true locations of yuanshengtai, Kaili was 
the disinterested packager of yuanshengtai for visitors from other cities. It was these visitors who 
were the genuine consumers of yuanshengtai, while those who dwelt in the packaging zone were 
close enough to the product to understand it, but not so close that they had become part of the 
product.
Throughout this paper, I have stressed the spatial aspects of yuanshengtai discourse. At the 
heart of yuanshengtai is a conceptualization of rural place as a nurturer of authentic cultural 
practices and genuine minorities. Whereas studio-based performances of yuanshengtai are merely 
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representations of this rural place, Kaili is a purported homeland of yuanshengtai. Local branding 
has accordingly attempted to present the Kaili itself as yuanshengtai, despite recent modernization 
and urbanization. While understandably willing to support the promotion of their city, the 
inhabitants of Kaili have firmly located yuanshengtai outside of the city, in the surrounding rural 
hinterland. In the process, Kaili has become the homeland of the self-proclaimed fake minority, 
who enthusiastically recommend yuanshengtai to visitors from the big cities while remaining 
personally aloof from such rural practices. This entails a representation of big-city tourists as 
authenticity-seekers which is certainly debatable, but which accords with the wider assumption of 
place and heritage promotion that it is the timeless and the rural which most deserves to be 
valorized as representative of ethnic practices. And it is this same assumption which has produced 
a desire among urbanities in Kaili – and perhaps the inhabitants of other southwest tourist cities – 
to delink themselves from marked ethnic practices and categories. For such individuals, it is 
preferable to position themselves as unmarked subjects within the modernizing discourse of the 
urban – and even to reconfigure urban hierarchies of small and big city – rather than to serve as the 
backward ethnic tourees against whom the modern tourist is defined. 
